We study pricing by multiproduct …rms in the context of unregulated monopoly, regulated monopoly and Cournot oligopoly. Using the concept of consumer surplus as a function of quantities (rather than prices), we present simple formulas for optimal prices and show that Cournot equilibrium exists and corresponds to a Ramsey optimum. We then present a tractable class of demand systems that involve a generalized form of homothetic preferences. As well as standard homothetic preferences, this class includes linear and logit demand. Within the class, pro…t-maximizing quantities are proportional to e¢cient quantities. We discuss cost-passthrough, including cases where optimal prices do not depend on other products' costs. Finally, we discuss optimal monopoly regulation when the …rm has private information about its vector of marginal costs, and show that if the probability distribution over costs satis…es an independence property, then optimal regulation leaves relative price decisions to the …rm.
Introduction
The theory of multiproduct pricing is a large and diverse subject. Unlike the single-product case, a multiproduct …rm must decide about the structure of its relative prices as well as its overall price level. Classical questions include the characterization of optimal pricing by a multiproduct monopolist seeking to maximize pro…t-or, as with Ramsey pricing, the most e¢cient way to generate a speci…ed level of pro…t-when its choice for one price must Both authors at All Souls College and the Department of Economics, University of Oxford. We are grateful to Konrad Stahl (who discussed an early version this paper at the University of Mannheim workshop on "Multiproduct …rms in industrial organization and international trade", 23-24 October, 2015) and to Jonas Müller-Gastell for helpful comments. take into account its impact on demand for other products. Additional complexities arise in oligopoly, when a multiproduct …rm needs to choose prices to re ‡ect both intra-…rm substitution (or complementarity) features and inter-…rm interactions. Optimal regulation of a multiproduct …rm with private information about its costs, say, must take into account not just its likely average cost across all products but its pattern of relative costs.
In this paper we show how these issues can be illuminated by studying consumer preferences in terms of consumer surplus considered as a function of quantities (rather than the more familiar function of prices).
1 In section 2 we show how pro…t-maximizing and other
Ramsey prices, as well as prices in symmetric Cournot equilibrium, can be expressed as a markup over marginal costs proportional to the derivative of this surplus function. In particular, a product's optimal price is below marginal cost when consumer surplus decreases with the supply of this product. We also show how a Cournot equilibrium corresponds to an appropriate Ramsey optimum, and vice versa, which enables us to construct and demonstrate existence of Cournot equilibrium in many cases.
A well-known feature of Ramsey pricing is that when required departures of optimal quantities from e¢cient quantities are small, then optimal quantities are approximately proportional to the e¢cient quantities. Thus, a reasonable rule of thumb is often to scale down quantities equiproportionately relative to e¢cient quantities, rather than to increase prices equiproportionately above marginal cost. For larger departures of prices from costs, though, optimal quantities are generally not proportional to e¢cient quantities. In section 3, we specialise the demand system so that consumer surplus is a homothetic function of quantities, which implies that relative quantities (or relative price-cost markups) do not depend on the weight placed on pro…t in the Ramsey objective. As shown in section 3.2, this is quite a ‡exible class of demand systems (much broader than the class where consumer surplus is homothetic in prices), and as well as the obvious case of gross utility being homothetic in quantities it includes linear and logit demands.
In section 3.3, we show that this property, together with assuming constant returns to scale, simpli…es the analysis by allowing a multiproduct problem to be decomposed into two steps: …rst calculate the e¢cient quantities which correspond to marginal cost pricing, and second solve for the scale factor by which to reduce the e¢cient quantities. This simpli…es comparative static analysis, such as how monopoly (and oligopoly) prices vary with cost parameters. In some leading examples there is zero "cross-cost" passthrough-e.g., the most pro…table price of each product depends only on its own cost-and more generally there are simple formulas for the size and sign of cross-cost e¤ects.
The fact that a pro…t-maximizing …rm has e¢cient incentives with respect to the pattern, though of course not the level, of quantities has implications, moreover, for regulation of multiproduct monopoly (section 3.4). It suggests that, in our class of demand systems, it might be optimal for regulation to allow the monopolist considerable discretion over the pattern of relative quantities (or prices). If the probability distribution over costs is such that relative costs and average costs are stochastically independent, this intuition is precisely correct and it is optimal for the choice of relative quantities to be delegated to the …rm.
Related literature: Baumol and Bradford (1970) , and the many references therein, discuss the economic principles of Ramsey pricing. They suggest (p. 271) that it is plausible that "the damage to welfare resulting from departures from marginal cost pricing will be minimized if the relative quantities of the various products sold are kept unchanged from their marginal cost pricing proportions." One aim of our paper is to make this intuition precise in a broad class of demand systems. Gorman (1961) described a class of utility functions such that income expansion paths (or Engel curves) for quantities demanded were linear. This resembles our class of utility functions, for which Ramsey quantities are equiproportional; that is, where the quantity vector which maximizes consumer utility subject to a pro…t constraint expand linearly as the pro…t requirement is relaxed. Gorman's preference family was such that the consumer's expenditure function took the form, e(p; u) = a(p) + ub(p), where a and b are homogeneous degree 1, while Proposition 2 below shows that our family has gross utility of the form
) where h and q are homogeneous degree 1.
Cournot oligopoly is studied in a rich literature on single-product …rms-see Vives (1999, chapter 4) for an overview of existence, uniqueness and comparative statics of Cournot equilibria. Sometimes a Cournot oligopoly operates as if it maximizes an objective. Bergstrom and Varian (1985) observe that a symmetric oligopoly maximizes a Ramsey objective, while Slade (1994) and Monderer and Shapley (1996) note that oligopolists sometimes maximize a more abstract "potential function". This is useful as it converts the …xed-point problem of calculating equilibrium quantities into a simpler optimization problem. In Proposition 1 we extend this analysis to cover multiproduct cases and, like Bergstrom and Varian (1985) , show that oligopolists maximize an appropriate Ramsey objective. Weyl and Fabinger (2013) discuss the passthrough of costs to prices and its various applications in settings of monopoly and imperfect competition with single-product …rms.
Within the marketing literature on retailing, a major theme is the extent to which wholesale cost shocks (such as temporary promotions) are passed through into retail prices. Besanko et al. (2005) empirically examine the patterns of cost passthrough in a large supermarket chain. They …nd that own-cost proportional passthrough is more than 60% for most product categories (and sometimes more than 100%), while cross-cost passthrough can take either sign. Moorthy (2005) analyzes a theoretical model where two retailers compete to supply two products to consumers, and as well as cost passthrough within a retailer he discusses how cost shock to the rival a¤ects …rm's prices. The sign of most of the passthrough e¤ects depends in an opaque way on the features of various matrices. In section 3.3, our demand system yields some relatively simple multiproduct passthrough relationships.
The optimal regulation of multi-product monopoly is analyzed by La¤ont and Tirole (1993, chapter 3) . In their main model, cost outturns are observable but the regulator cannot observe cost-reducing e¤ort or the …rm's underlying cost type. If the cost function is separable between quantities on the one hand and the …rm's e¤ort and type on the other, then the "incentive-pricing dichotomy" holds-pricing should not be used to provide e¤ort incentives. If there is a social cost of public funds, Ramsey pricing is therefore optimal, as characterized by "super-elasticity" formulas for markups. The analysis of regulation in section 3.4 below does not consider e¤ort incentives, but is for the situation studied by Baron and Myerson (1982) where the regulator cannot observe the …rm's costs. We extend this model to cover multiproduct situations where a vector of marginal costs is unobserved by the regulator. Building on the approach in Armstrong (1996) and Armstrong and Vickers (2001) , we describe a tractable class of situations in which it is optimal to control only the …rm's average output, leaving it free to choose relative outputs to re ‡ect its relative costs.
Suppose there are n 2 products, where the quantity of product i is denoted x i and the vector of quantities is x = (x 1 ; :::; x n ). Consumers have quasi-linear utility, which implies that demand can be considered to be generated by a single representative consumer with gross utility function u(x) de…ned on a (full-dimensional) convex region R R n + which includes zero, where u(0) = 0 and u is increasing and concave. (We might have R = R n + , so that utility is de…ned for all non-negative quantity bundles.) We suppose that u is twice continuously di¤erentiable in the interior of R, although marginal utility might be unbounded as some quantities tend to zero.
Faced with price vector p = (p 1 ; :::; p n ), the consumer chooses quantities x 2 R to maximize u(x) p x. (Here, a b P n i=1 a i b i denotes the dot product of two vectors a and b.) The price vector which induces interior quantity vector x 2 R to be demanded, i.e., the inverse demand function p(x), is
where we use the gradient notation rf (x) (@f (x)=@x 1 ; :::; @f (x)=@x n ) for the vector of partial derivatives of a function f . To ensure we can invert p(x) to obtain the demand function x(p), assume that the matrix of second derivatives of u, which we write as Dp(x), is non-singular (and hence negative-de…nite). The revenue generated from quantity vector x is r(x) = x ru(x) ; while the surplus retained by the consumer from x is
One of this paper's aims is to show the usefulness of the function s(x) for analyzing multiproduct pricing.
We next discuss some features of s(x). First, the right-hand side of expression (1) shows that s( ) is related to the elasticity of scale of u( ) evaluated at x, and a more concave u allows the consumer to retain more surplus. 2 Second, the derivative of s can be expressed as
so that an equiproportionate contraction in quantities x moves the price vector in the direction rs(x), i.e., normal to the surface s(x) = constant. To see (2), note that
where the third equality follows from the symmetry of cross-derivatives of p(x). Unlike consumer surplus expressed as a function of prices-which is necessarily a decreasing function of prices-here s(x) can increase or decrease with x i . 3 From (2), a su¢cient condition for s to increase with x i is that p i decrease with all x j , which is the case if products are gross substitutes (see Vives (1999, section 6 .1)). Note, though, that the above expressions imply that for x 6 = 0 we have
where the inequality follows from the matrix Dp(x) being negative-de…nite. Thus consumer surplus increases as all quantities are increased equiproportionately.
The Ramsey monopoly problem: Now suppose that these products are supplied by a monopolist with di¤erentiable cost function c(x). To sidestep issues of …xed costs and the potential undesirability of producing at all, both with monopoly and in the later analysis of Cournot oligopoly, we suppose that
Consider the Ramsey problem of choosing quantities to maximize a weighted sum of pro…t and consumer surplus. If 1 is the relative weight on consumer surplus, the Ramsey objective is
This includes as polar cases pro…t maximization ( = 0) and total surplus maximization ( = 1). Standard comparative statics shows that optimal consumer surplus, s(x), in this Ramsey problem weakly increases with , while optimal pro…t [r(x) c(x)] weakly decreases with . Total surplus is maximized at quantities x w which involve prices equal to marginal costs, so that p(x w ) = rc(x w ), and assumption (4) ensures that the …rm breaks even with marginal-cost pricing. More generally, the Ramsey problem with weight has …rst-order condition for optimal quantities given by
Thus, when < 1 the optimal departure of price from marginal cost is proportional to rs(x). In particular, the Ramsey price for product i is above its marginal cost if surplus s(x) increases with x i at optimal quantities, while using the product as a "loss leader" is optimal if s(x) decreases with x i . As we will see later, there are also natural cases where s depends only on the quantities of a subset of products, in which case (6) indicates that the remaining products should be priced at marginal cost. Thus, the function s succinctly determines when it is optimal to set a price above, below, or equal to marginal cost. 
in which case
so that x = x w approximately satis…es condition (6). (Here, the …rst strict equality follows from the e¢ciency of quantities x w while the second follows from the homogeneity of c( ).) In sum, in the Ramsey problem with constant returns to scale and 1, the e¢cient quantities should be scaled back equiproportionately by the factor .
Without making further assumptions, there is little reason to expect that this insight for 1 extends to the situation where a monopolist maximizes pro…t ( = 0), and in general pro…t-maximizing quantities are not proportional to e¢cient quantities. To illustrate, the bold curve on Figure 1 depicts Ramsey quantity vectors as the weight on consumer surplus varies from = 0 to = 1. 5 As shown, these Ramsey quantities are the vectors-the "contract curve" between consumers and the …rm-where iso-pro…t contours (which are curves centred on pro…t-maximizing quantities) are tangent to isowelfare contours (centred on e¢cient quantities). As discussed above, when 1 optimal quantities are approximately proportional to e¢cient quantities, and so when = 1 the bold line is tangent to the dashed ray from the origin. Cournot oligopoly: A natural development of our framework is to the Cournot oligopoly setting with m symmetric …rms that each supply the full range of products and have the cost function c( ) satisfying (4). Our main result in this context is that equilibrium in this m-player game is closely related to an appropriate Ramsey optimum. Assumption (4) implies that the least-cost way for the industry to supply total quantity vector x is to split this quantity equally between the m …rms so that total cost is mc( 1 m x). In this case the Ramsey objective (5) becomes
so that the corresponding …rst-order condition for the optimal vector of total quantity x is x, which from expression (2) has the …rst-order condition
Comparing with (10) with (9) Proof. We …rst rule out asymmetric equilibria. Consider a (possibly asymmetric) candidate equilibrium in which …rm j supplies quantity vector x j , where x = j x j is the total supply. At an asymmetric equilibrium, at least one …rm must have
x. In this equilibrium …rm j must maximize its pro…t
by choosing y = x j . In particular, it cannot be pro…table to deviate from supplying
, where " is a scalar. Evaluating the derivative of j (x j + "(x mx j )) with respect to " at " = 0 therefore yields
where the inequality (11) follows from the negative-de…niteness of the matrix Dp(x). This inequality is strict if
x, which is the case for some …rm in an asymmetric equilibrium, and so summing (11) across the m …rms we obtain
which is a contradiction. To see the second inequality in (12), note that the convexity of
, while the third inequality in (12) follows directly from the convexity of c( ). We deduce that x cannot be equilibrium supply unless it is symmetrically shared between …rms.
Turning to equilibrium existence, note that the Ramsey objective (8) can be written 
In particular, choosing y = x. This …rm chooses its quantity vector y to maximize its pro…t
where the inequality follows from the concavity of u. Since (
where the …nal inequality follows since y = 1 m x maximizes (y). We deduce it is a Cournot equilibrium for each …rm to supply
Finally, consider the uniqueness of equilibrium. We have already shown there are no asymmetric equilibria, while expression (10) shows that any symmetric equilibrium satis…es the …rst-order conditions for maximizing the Ramsey objective (8) . In this sense, the Cournot problem and the (appropriately weighted)
Ramsey problem are the same. This generalizes the second remark in Bergstrom and Varian (1985) -that a symmetric single-product Cournot oligopoly can be considered to maximize a Ramsey objective-to the multiproduct context.
When c(x) is homogeneous degree 1, the number of suppliers has no impact on industry costs and the Ramsey objectives (5) and (8) x w (where x w is the e¢cient quantity vector). One can also study how equilibrium prices depend on marginal costs by studying the simple Ramsey problem, as we do below in section 3.3.
The analysis in Proposition 1 assumes …rms are symmetric. Among other issues, this assumption means one cannot study the impact of …rm-speci…c cost shocks, for instance, but only industry-wide cost shocks. When Cournot equilibria exist in asymmetric settings it is straightforward to obtain …rst-order conditions for equilibrium prices. For example, suppose that each …rm has constant marginal costs, and …rm j has the marginal cost vector c j = (c j 1 ; :::; c j n ). Then if all …rms supply all products in equilibrium, an argument similar to (10) shows that equilibrium prices satisfy Bertrand oligopoly: Although it is not the focus of this paper, consider brie ‡y one way to model Bertrand competition in this framework. Bliss (1988) and Armstrong and Vickers (2001, section 2) suggested a model where consumers buy all products from one …rm or another, so there is one-stop shopping, and …rms therefore compete in terms of the surplus they o¤er their customers. Each consumer has the same gross utility, u(x), when they purchase quantity vector x from a …rm, and this utility function is the same at all …rms. Firms compete by o¤ering linear prices, so that a consumer obtains surplus s(x) when they buy quantity x from a …rm via linear prices, while …rm i, say, obtains pro…t r(x) c i (x) from each customer where c i (x) is this …rm's constant-returns-to-scale cost function. (Unlike the previous Cournot model, here it is straightforward to allow …rms to have di¤erent cost functions.) Consumers di¤er in their brand preferences for the various …rms, say due to the distances they must travel to reach them, and the number of customers a …rm attracts increases with the surplus s it o¤ers and decreases with the surplus its rivals o¤er.
In this framework, each …rm's strategy can be broken down into two steps: (i) choose the most pro…table way to deliver a given surplus to a customer, and (ii) choose how much surplus to o¤er its customers.
Step (i) is just the Ramsey problem as discussed above, and a …rm's optimal prices take the form (6) where now will re ‡ect the …rm's competitive constraints in step (ii) rather than concern for consumer welfare. In equilibrium there is intra-…rm e¢ciency, but with cost di¤erences across …rms there will not in general be industry-wide e¢ciency (i.e., industry pro…ts are not maximized subject to an overall consumer surplus constraint).
The general analysis in this section has introduced the consumer surplus function s(x)
and shown its usefulness in analyzing the Ramsey monopoly problem and, by extension, the symmetric Cournot oligopoly problem. In the rest of the paper we develop the analysis of monopoly and oligopoly by supposing that s is homothetic in x. This speci…cation includes a number of familiar multiproduct demand systems, and has notably convenient properties. In particular, the feature of equiproportionate quantity reduction that appeared locally (for 1 in the Ramsey problem or large m in the Cournot equilibrium) in the analysis above, holds globally.
3 A family of demand systems
Homothetic consumer surplus
The family of demand systems on which we now focus is characterized by the property that consumer surplus s(x) is a homothetic function of quantities x. We …rst describe which demand systems have this property:
Proposition 2 Consumer surplus s(x) is homothetic in x if and only if utility u(x) can be written in the form
where h( ) and q( ) are homogeneous degree 1 functions and g( ) is concave with g(0) = 0.
Proof. First, note that we must have g(0) = 0 and g concave in q given that u(0) = 0 and u( ) is concave in x. (Since u is concave, when u takes the form (14) for given x the
To show su¢ciency, note that (14) implies that inverse demand is
Revenue is therefore
where we used the fact that x rh(x) h(x) for a homogenous degree 1 function. Consumer
which is homothetic since s(x) is an increasing function of the homogenous function q(x).
(Since g is concave, g(q) g 0 (q)q is an increasing function.)
To show necessity, suppose that consumer surplus s(x) is homothetic, so that s(x) G(q(x)) for some increasing function G and some function q(x) which is homogeneous degree 1. We can write G as G(q) g(q) qg 0 (q) for another function g( ).
7 Then
7 Given any function G( ), one can generate the corresponding g( ) using the procedure
This function g(q) is concave given that G(q) is increasing.
Note that (1) can be generalized slightly so that s(x=k) = d dk ku(x=k), and so (18) can be integrated to yield
for some constant of integration h(x). Writing x =x=k this becomes
Since this holds for all k we deduce that u(x) = h(x) + g(q(x)), where h(x) is homogeneous degree 1.
This result implies that the set of demand systems in which consumer surplus is homothetic in quantities is broader than that where consumer surplus is homothetic in prices. Expressed as a function of prices, consumer surplus is the convex function v(p) = max x 0 fu(x) p xg. Duality implies that u(x) can be recovered from v(p) using the procedure u(x) = min p 0 fv(p) + p xg, and if v(p) is homothetic in p then u(x) = min p 0 fv(p) + p xg is homothetic in x. Thus, the utility functions such that consumer surplus is homothetic in prices are simply the homothetic utility functions, i.e., where h 0 in (14), which is a subset of the family of preferences we study. In section 3.2 we discuss familiar instances of the family (14) which do not have homothetic u( ).
For the remainder of the paper we assume that utility u(x), as well as being increasing and concave, can be written in the form (14). Some immediate observations on this preference speci…cation are:
For a speci…c utility function u(x) it may not be obvious a priori whether it accords with the form (14). However, Proposition 2 implies that this is the case whenever consumer surplus, s(x) u(x) x ru(x), is homothetic, which in practice is easy to check.
Expression (15) implies that an equiproportionate change in quantities moves the price vector along a straight line in the direction rq(x). In geometric terms, then, quantity vectors on the ray joining x to the origin correspond to price vectors which lie on the straight line starting at p(x) pointing in the direction rq(x).
If u satis…es (14), then the modi…ed environment in which a subset of these products are removed also satis…es (14). That is, if a subset of products have quantities x i set equal to zero, the utility function u de…ned on the remaining products continues to satisfy (14).
Since g is concave, the function g(q) g 0 (q)q in (17) is an increasing function, so surplus s increases with x i -and the Ramsey price for product i is above marginal cost in (6)-if and only if q( ) increases with x i .
When utility takes the form (14), the revenue function (16) takes a similar form, with the same h and q (but with qg 0 (q) replacing g(q)). For this reason, a multiproduct monopolist's problem of maximizing pro…t-discussed below in section 3.3-is closely connected to the consumer's problem of maximizing surplus, where prices in the consumer's problem correspond to marginal costs in the …rm's problem.
There are three degrees of freedom when choosing a demand system within the classq(x), h(x) and g(q)-and expression (14) provides a useful toolkit for constructing tractable multiproduct demand systems with particular desired properties. For this purpose it is useful to know conditions for the resulting utility function u to be concave. Su¢cient conditions to ensure that u in (14) is concave are that h and g are concave and either: (i) q is concave and g is increasing; (ii) q is convex and g is decreasing, or (iii) q is linear in x (which allows g to be non-monotonic).
For the remainder of this subsection we discuss in more detail the implications of this utility speci…cation for the corresponding demand system, denoted x(p). Given prices p, the consumer with utility (14) can maximize her surplus with a simple two-step procedure.
We can write quantities x in the form
Here, x=q(x) is homogeneous degree zero and depends only on the ray from the origin on which x lies, while q(x) is homogeneous degree 1 and measures how far along that ray x lies, and so the decomposition (19) represents a generalized form of "polar coordinates"
for the quantity vector x. (The coordinate x=q(x) lies on the (n 1)-dimensional surface q 1.) Henceforth we refer to q(x) as "composite" quantity and x=q(x) as the "relative" quantities.
We know already that (maximized) consumer surplus, s(x), depends on x only via composite quantity q(x). More generally, consumer surplus with arbitrary quantities x and prices p can be written in terms of the coordinates in (19) as
(Since the function p x h(x) is homogeneous degree 1, (p x h(x))=q(x) depends only on the relative quantities x=q(x).) Since consumer surplus in (20) is decreasing in
(p x h(x))=q(x), the consumer should choose relative quantities to minimize this term, regardless of her choice for composite quantity. Therefore, write
which is an increasing and concave function of p. The envelope theorem implies that its derivative is the optimal choice of relative quantities, so if we write x (p) r (p) the consumer facing prices p chooses relative quantities x (p).
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Given the relative quantities, x (p), the optimal choice of composite quantity, say Q, is easily derived. Consumer surplus in (20) with the optimal relative quantities is the concave function g(Q) Q (p). WriteQ( ) for the composite quantity which maximizes g(Q) Q , which is necessarily weakly downward-sloping, so thatQ( (p)) is the demand for composite quantity given the price vector p. Price vectors with the same (p) induce the consumer to choose the same composite quantity Q, and so (p) is the "composite" price which corresponds to composite quantity q(x). Since the consumer chooses relative quantities x (p) and composite quantityQ( (p)), from (19) the vector of quantities demanded at prices p is
Here, the function g( ) determines the shape the composite demand functionQ( ), while the functions h( ) and q( ) combine to determine the form of composite price function ( ).
Expression (22) implies that cross or own-price demand e¤ects are
(Here, recall that x (p) = r (p), while subscripts to denote its partial derivatives.) This is akin to the Slutsky Equation from classical demand theory. The …rst term in (23) represents the substitution e¤ect while staying on the same composite quantity (or consumer surplus) contour, and the second term represents the impact of a price rise on the composite quantity demanded. This second term is negative, while the …rst term is negative if j = i and could be positive or negative when j 6 = i. For instance, if utility is homothetic then (p) is positive and homogenous degree 1, and expression (23) . Here the …rst term is the elasticity of substitution of demand and the second term is the elasticity of composite demand, and the relative sizes of these two elasticities determines the sign of cross-price e¤ects.
Since inverse demand p(x) in (15) induces demand x, it follows that
In particular, for …xed Q any price vector of the form p = rh(x) + g 0 (Q)rq(x) induces the same composite demand Q, and hence the same consumer surplus s = g(Q) Qg 0 (Q) and composite price (p) = g 0 (Q). Conversely, since demand x(p) induces inverse demand p, substituting (22) into the expression for inverse demand (15), and recalling that for positive demand we have g 0 (Q( )) , reveals that
(Alternatively, this expression is the …rst-order condition for problem (21).) Expression (25) is the analogue for prices of the change of coordinates for quantities in (19), and decomposes the price vector p into composite price, (p), and "relative prices" which in this context we de…ne to be x (p), i.e., the relative quantities which are optimal with prices p. From (24), prices which induce relative quantities x lie on the straight line :7 ! rh(x ) + rq(x ), which is not necessarily a ray from the origin, while the coordinate (p) determines how far along such a line the price vector lies.
Special cases
If u( ) is itself homothetic-for instance, if demand takes the familiar CES form-then (14) is trivially satis…ed by setting h 0. In this case, expression (21) implies that (p)
is homogeneous degree 1, and x (p) = r (p) is homogeneous degree zero. More generally, homothetic demand is an instance of the subclass of (14) where h takes the linear form h(x) = a x, when in (21) is a function that is homogenous degree 1 in the "adjusted" price vector (p a).
Linear demand: Another instance of this subclass with linear h( ) is linear demand,
where utility u(x) takes the quadratic form
for constant vector a > 0 and (symmetric) positive-de…nite matrix M . Here, inverse demands are p(x) = a M x, and utility takes the form (14) by writing h(x) = a x, q(x) = p x M x and g(q) = 1 2 q 2 . Here, rq(x) = M x and so expression (24) implies that the set of price vectors which correspond to the same relative quantities takes the form p = a tM x for scalar t, which are rays originating from the vector of choke prices a. It may be that q(x) and therefore s(x) decrease with x i when o¤-diagonal elements of M are negative (which corresponds to products being complements).
Logit demand: Suppose that consumer demand takes the logit form
where a = (a 1 ; :::; a n ) is a constant vector. It follows that inverse demand is
where q(x) P j x j is total quantity. This inverse demand function (28) integrates to give the utility function
(As with any demand system resulting from discrete choice, the utility function is only de…ned on the domain i x i 1. 9 ) This utility can be written in the required form (14) as
Here, h(x) as labelled is homogenous degree 1, as is total output q(x), while g(q) is equal to the entropy function g(q) = q log q (1 q) log(1 q), which is concave in 0 q 1.
Since g 0 (q) = log(1 q) log q, demand for composite quantity as a function of composite price takes the logistic form. 10 With logit, as with homogeneous goods, consumer surplus is a function only of total quantity, and product di¤erentiation is re ‡ected separately in the h(x) term. Since rq(x) (1; :::; 1), the set of prices which correspond to the same relative quantities takes the form p + (t; :::; t), as can be seen directly from (27). This contrasts with the subclass with linear h(x), where these lines were not parallel but emanated from a point. More generally, with any demand system in the subclass with linear q(x) = b x, the set of prices which correspond to quantity vectors on a given ray from the origin take the form of parallel straight lines.
Systems of strictly complementary products:
A common situation is where consumers purchase a single unit of a "base product", and then combine this with variable quantities of one or more complementary products. For instance, a consumer may need to gain entry to a theme park before they can go on the rides (Oi, 1971) , or needs to buy a printer along with a suitable quantity of ink in order to print. To illustrate how these situations sometimes …t into our framework, suppose there is a continuum of consumers indexed by scalar , where the type-consumer has gross utility U (y) + if she consumes quantity y of the combined service. (The following discussion also applies if y is a vector of multiple services.) Adding over the population of consumers implies that aggregate gross utility if x 1 consumers (those with the highest value of ) each consume quantity y of combined service takes the form x 1 U (y) + g(x 1 ) for some increasing concave function g( ),
where g is determined by the distribution of . If x 2 denotes the quantity of combined service across all consumers, so that x 2 = x 1 y, it follows that aggregate utility in terms of the quantity vector (
Clearly, this utility function …ts into our family (14), where h(x) = x 1 U (x 2 =x 1 ) and composite quantity is just q(x) = x 1 . This is another instance of the subclass with linear q(x), but here s(x) is a function only of x 1 , the number of active consumers. The set of prices which correspond to the same relative quantities-i.e., the same usage per active consumer-are horizontal lines with p 2 constant.
Analysis
In this section we discuss how to maximize welfare and pro…t, as well as calculate oligopoly outcomes, when the demand system satis…es (14) and the cost function satis…es c(x) is convex and homogeneous degree 1.
Consider again the problem of maximizing a weighted sum of pro…t and consumer surplus.
If 0 1 is the relative weight on consumer surplus, the Ramsey objective (5) is
Here, we used the formulas (16)- (17).
As with the consumer's problem in section 3.1, the Ramsey problem can conveniently be solved by means of the change of variables (19). Expression (32) shows how the Ramsey objective can be written in terms of composite quantity q(x) and the relative quantities x=q(x). Expression (32) is decreasing in the term (c(x) h(x))=q(x), and so relative quantities should be chosen to minimize this term. As in (21), write = min
which is solved by choosing relative quantities x = x , say. (Since the quantity vector which minimizes (33) is indeterminate up to a scaling factor, as in section 3.1 we normalize x so that q(x ) = 1. 11 ) We deduce that maximizing any Ramsey objective involves choosing the same relative quantities x , in contrast to the case depicted in Figure 1 . In particular, pro…t-maximizing quantities ( = 0) are proportional to the e¢cient quantities corresponding to marginal-cost pricing ( = 1). That is, the unregulated …rm has an incentive to choose its relative quantities in an e¢cient manner, and the sole ine¢ciency arises from it supplying too little composite quantity.
Given this choice for relative quantities, the optimal choice for composite quantity Q is easily derived. Expression (32) with relative quantities x is the function
11 There is a unique vector of relative quantities which solves (33) provided that (c h) is quasi-convex and q is quasi-concave with one of them strictly so. To illustrate this analysis, suppose that q(x 1 ; x 2 ) = p x 1 x 2 , h(x 1 ; x 2 ) = 0 and c(x 1 ; x 2 ) = p c 2 1 x 2 1 + c 2 2 x 2 2 . Then one can check that x = (
) The vector of quantities which solves the Ramsey problem is then
Qx , where Q maximizes expression (34). The optimal composite quantity Q increases with and decreases with , and satis…es the Lerner formula
where
is the elasticity of inverse demand for composite quantity.
Since relative quantities are the same in all Ramsey problems, so too are relative pricecost margins. As discussed in section 3.1, this is because an equiproportionate reduction in e¢cient quantities causes the price vector to move in a straight line away from the vector of marginal costs. In more detail, the optimal quantities for the Ramsey problem are Qx , where Q satis…es (35), and in particular let the composite quantity which maximizes total surplus (i.e., when = 1) be denoted Q w , so that g 0 (Q w ) = . Then the price-cost margins in the Ramsey problem with composite quantity Q are
(Here, the …rst equality follows from rc being homogeneous degree zero, the second follows from (15), and the …nal equality follows since prices equal marginal costs and g 0 = when Q = Q w .) These margins are proportional to rq(x ), and shrink equiproportionately when Q is larger. Product i is used as a loss leader, in the sense that its price is below marginal cost, in each Ramsey problem when composite quantity q decreases with x i at x .
By virtue of the Ramsey-Cournot result in Proposition 1, these properties extend to symmetric Cournot oligopoly. To summarise:
Proposition 3 Suppose that utility takes the form (14) and cost takes the form (31). As more weight is placed on consumer surplus in the Ramsey problem, the composite quantity increases, the composite price decreases, each individual quantity increases equiproportionately, and each price-cost margin contracts equiproportionately. The same is true in symmetric Cournot equilibrium as the number of …rms increases.
An important special case involves constant marginal costs, so that c(x) c x for a constant vector of marginal costs c = (c 1 ; :::; c n ). In this case, in (33) is simply (c)
where the function ( ) is de…ned in (21), while x = x (c). In this context, consider how optimal prices relate to the …rm's costs. This analysis is most transparent using the change of variables for prices (and costs) in (25), so that (p) is the composite price and
x (p) are relative prices (and similarly for the cost vector). As discussed earlier, in any Ramsey problem it is optimal to choose relative quantities equal to the relative quantities which correspond to e¢cient marginal-cost pricing. This immediately implies that it is optimal to choose relative prices equal to the …rm's relative costs, so that x (p) = x (c).
The optimal markup of composite price over composite cost is then given by (35), and the optimal composite price, (p), decreases with the weight on consumer surplus, , and increases with composite cost, (c).
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What does this mean for price-cost relationships: how does p i depend on c j ? Expressions (35) and (37) imply that optimal prices satisfy
Consider …rst the subclass where h takes the linear form h(x) = a x. Since optimal quantities are Qx (c), expression (15) shows that prices satisfy
Putting (38) and (39) together implies that
In particular, when preferences are homothetic, so that a = 0, we obtain the familiar result that proportional price-cost markups are the same across products.
In the iso-elastic case where is constant, expression (40) implies that the optimal price for product i depends only on c i , not on any other product's cost, and so there is no "cross-cost" passthrough in prices, even though there may be substantial cross-price e¤ects in the demand system. Moreover, provided that the consumer can obtain positive utility with a subset of products (e.g., if > 0 in the CES speci…cation), the optimal price for one product is una¤ected if the …rm is restricted to o¤er a subset of products (or even just that product). 13 For instance, if u is homothetic and g(Q) = 1 Q , where 0 < < 1, then 1 and (40) implies that the most pro…table prices (i.e.,when = 0) are
Likewise, with linear demand we have 1 and expression (40) implies that the pro…t-maximizing prices are
More generally within this subclass with linear h, expression (40) and the fact that the most pro…table Q decreases with each cost implies that all cross-cost passthrough terms for p i have the same sign as (a i c i ) 0 (Q).
15
Alternatively, consider the subclass where composite quantity takes the linear form
In the example with complementary products where utility is (30) and b = (1; 0), this expression implies there is marginal-cost pricing for usage (p 2 = c 2 ), and in particular changes in c 1 have no impact on p 2 . However, there is cross-cost passthrough in the other direction: since the optimal Q decreases with both costs, it follows that p 1 increases or decreases with c 2 according to whether (Q)g 0 (Q) decreases or increases with Q. In the logit example utility is (29) and b = (1; :::; 1), so the price-cost margin p i c i is the same for 13 Shugan and Desiraju (2001) discuss these points in the context of linear demand with two products. In the context of product line pricing, Johnson and Myatt (2015) explore when it is that a …rm's optimal price for one product variant can be calculated by supposing that the …rm only supplies that variant. (They consider both monopoly and Cournot settings.) 14 It usually makes sense only to consider non-negative quantities, in which case (41) is only valid if a and c are such that the optimal quantities, x = 1 2 M 1 (a c), are positive. In the case of substitutes, where the matrix M necessarily has all non-negative elements, a necessary condition for this is that each a i c i . (When M has all non-negative elements, the operation x 7 ! M x takes R n + into itself.) However, with complements, it is possible to have all x i positive and some a i c i negative. In such cases, (41) indicates that p i < c i for those products with a i < c i .
15 One can analyze how the optimal quantity supplied of one product is a¤ected by cost changes to other products in a similar manner to the consumer demand expression (23). For instance, since pro…t-maximizing quantities satisfy the …rst-order condition rr(x) = c, where c is the vector of constant marginal costs, there will be a dependence of one product's supply on another product's cost unless r(x) is additively separable in quantities, which is (essentially) only the case if demand for one product does not depend on other prices. each product i, and the common markup (1 ) (Q)g 0 (Q) = (1 )=(1 Q), increases with Q < 1. Since the optimal Q decreases with each c i , it follows that cross-cost passthrough is negative and one product's price decreases with each other product's cost.
As shown in Proposition 1, with m …rms each with a cost function satisfying (31) the outcome with Cournot oligopoly coincides with the Ramsey optimum, provided we set the weight on consumer interests in the Ramsey problem equal to = m 1 m . With our demand system (14), then, expression (35) implies that equilibrium composite quantity satis…es
and Proposition 3 has the corollary that as the number of competitors increases composite quantity increases, composite price decreases, each individual quantity increases equiproportionately, and each price-cost margin contracts equiproportionately. In addition, when c(x) = c x and h(x) = a x, expression (40) implies that
As in the Ramsey problem, cross-cost passthrough terms for product i have the same sign as (a i c i ) 0 (Q). (Here, a change in one product's cost is assumed to be industry-wide, not …rm-speci…c.) So if (Q) is constant, then the equilibrium price for one product does not depend on the costs of other products, and nor is one product's price a¤ected when only a subset of products is supplied by the industry.
Firm-speci…c cost shocks can be analyzed using expression (13). Thus, provided each …rm supplies all products in equilibrium, when h(x) = a x expression (43) continues to apply provided that the vector c is interpreted to be the industry average vector of marginal costs. To illustrate, with linear demand the equilibrium price for product i with m …rms is
where c j i is …rm j's cost for product i. Thus an increase in cost c j i will be passed through at rate 1 m+1 to product i's price and will have no impact on prices for other products.
Regulation with asymmetric information about costs
When the demand system falls within the family (14), we have seen that the unregulated monopolist will choose an e¢cient pattern of relative quantities, even though it supplies too little composite quantity. This suggests that, in some circumstances at least, the optimal way to regulate market power when the …rm has private information about its costs is to control only its composite quantity, leaving it free to choose relative quantities to re ‡ect its private information.
To explore this issue, we consider optimal regulation of multiproduct monopoly by extending the analysis of the single-product case by Baron and Myerson (1982) . Speci…cally, there is common knowledge about the demand system, which we assume satis…es (14), but the …rm has private information about its costs. In particular, suppose the …rm has the vector of constant marginal costs, c = (c 1 ; :::; c n ). Optimal regulation can be analyzed by way of a "direct" scheme whereby the …rm reports its cost vector, sayc, to the regulator, and conditional on this report the …rm is instructed to supply a vector of quantities X and receives a net transfer T funded by consumers (in addition to the usual revenue r(X)).
The revelation principle implies that we can restrict attention to mechanisms in which the …rm is given an incentive to report its cost vector truthfully, so thatc = c. The regulator places weight 0 1 on pro…t relative to consumer surplus, where pro…t includes the transfer T and consumer surplus includes the deduction for the transfer T .
Expression (25) implies we can decompose the cost vector c into composite costs, (c),
and relative costs, x (c), so that c = rh(x (c))+ (c)rq(x (c)). From this perspective, the …rm reports its private cost information in terms of coordinates (~ ;x ), and conditional on this report the regulator instructs it to supply composite quantity Q and relative quantities x .
It is useful to study …rst the situation where the coordinate x (c) can be directly observed by the regulator, before considering the more realistic situation where it is not.
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If the regulator knows the …rm's costs satisfy x (c) = x , say, then (25) implies that the cost vector lies on the straight line rh(x )+ rq(x ), where denotes the …rm's composite cost, (c). However, the regulator does not know where on this line the cost vector lies, and so needs to solve a one-dimensional screening problem. The following result describes optimal regulation in this situation, which adapts by-now standard arguments in Baron in the appendix to this paper.)
Lemma 1 Suppose the regulator knows the …rm's cost vector satis…es x (c) = x and believes the …rm's composite cost = (c) has cumulative distribution function F ( j x ) and associated density function f ( j x ). Provided (44) weakly increases with , optimal regulation requires the …rm with composite cost to supply the composite quantity,Q( (p)), corresponding to the composite price
and to supply the e¢cient relative quantities x .
This result shows that relative quantities are not distorted from the e¢cient relative quantities, x , while if < 1 expression (44) shows that composite price is above composite cost, and hence that composite quantity is below the e¢cient level, in order to reduce the rent enjoyed by the …rm. Although the result is expressed as the …rm being required to o¤er e¢cient relative quantities, it is clear that the …rm would anyway choose to do this if it had discretion to choose relative quantities.
Consider now the more natural case where the regulator cannot observe x (c). In general, with current techniques this seems to be an intractable problem. However, in the special case where the distribution for c is such that (c) and x (c) are independent random variables, the previous result provides the solution:
Proposition 4 Suppose the distribution for c is such that (c) and x (c) are stochastically independent, where the …rm's composite cost = (c) has cumulative distribution function F ( ) and associated density function f ( ). Provided (45) weakly increases with , optimal regulation requires the …rm with composite cost to supply the composite quantity,Q( (p)), corresponding to the composite price
and to supply the e¢cient relative quantities x (c).
variables. Since the sum and ratio of two i.i.d. exponential variables are independent, the method works if each c i is an independent draw from a distribution such that 1=c is exponentially distributed. 19 Speci…cally, suppose that each c i has support [0; 1) and CDF Pr fc tg = e 1 t . Then 1= is the sum of two exponential variables and so has CDF F ( ) = (1 + 1 )e 1 and corresponding density f ( ) = 1 3 e 1 . Expression (45) then implies that optimal composite price for the type-…rm is + (1 ) 2 (1 + ), which increases with as required, and (52) then implies that the optimal individual prices are
where is the function of c given by (46).
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In expression (47) there is marginal-cost pricing for those …rms with = 0, and so p i = c i whenever the other product has minimum cost c j = 0. The regulated price for one product is an increasing function of the other product's cost, even though this demand system has no cross-price e¤ects and there is no statistical correlation in costs across products. Note also that all types of …rm participate in the mechanism, and unlike in Armstrong (1996, section 3) there is no "exclusion" in the optimal scheme. However, so long as < 1, when the …rm has high costs the prices in (47) are above the unregulated pro…t-maximizing prices (which with this demand system are p i = 2c i ), a possibility that was noted in the single-product context by Baron and Myerson (1982, page 292) .
Similar analysis could be applied in the alternative situation with price-cap regulation, when transfer payments to the …rm are not feasible and instead the regulator speci…es the set of quantity (or price) vectors from which the …rm is permitted to choose. If, hypothetically, the regulator could observe the …rm's relative costs x (c), but not its composite cost (c), it could calculate the optimal set of quantity vectors from which the …rm can select, which plausibly will all be proportional to the e¢cient pattern x (c). 21 In this case, the regulator can let the iso-x …rms choose from a set of composite quantities, and let the …rm choose its pattern of relative quantities freely. When (c) and x (c) are stochastically 19 Another way to describe this distribution is that c i comes from an inverse-2 distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. 20 Another example which works nicely is when h = 0 and q(x) = p x 1 x 2 , so that (c) = 2 p c 1 c 2 . In this case Proposition 4 applies when the distribution for (c 1 ; c 2 ) is such that the product c 1 c 2 and the ratio c 1 =c 2 are stochastically independent, which is the case when each c i is an independent draw from a log-normal distribution. 21 It is possible that it is optimal to leave gaps in the set of permitted quantities. Even in the simpler single-product case, Alonso and Matouschek (2008) and Amador and Bagwell (2014) show how the regulator sometimes chooses to leave gaps in the set of permitted prices. independent, it follows that the permitted set of composite quantities does not depend on x (c), and this set of composite quantities then constitutes the optimal price-cap scheme.
Conclusions
In this paper we have studied a range of multiproduct pricing questions in terms of consumer surplus considered as a function of quantities. With a monopolist, this is the classical pro…t-maximization problem, or more generally the Ramsey problem of welfare maximization subject to a pro…t constraint. With oligopoly, by contrast, the multiproduct pricing question is one of equilibrium among independent …rms, not optimization by a single decision-maker. We have shown, however, that in perhaps the most natural multiproduct oligopoly model, with symmetric Cournot …rms, there is Ramsey-Cournot equivalence.
With suitable welfare weights as between pro…t and consumer surplus, Ramsey quantities are Cournot equilibrium quantities, and vice versa. Solutions to Ramsey optimization problems are therefore equilibrium solutions too.
The other main aim of the paper has been to show how multiproduct monopoly analysis is made simpler when consumer surplus is a homothetic function of quantities. Whether the …rm's objective is pro…t or a Ramsey combination of pro…t and consumer surplus, it optimizes by selecting e¢cient (i.e., welfare-maximizing) quantities scaled back equiproportionately. The resulting optimal markups yield, for example, transparent results on multiproduct cost passthrough, including instances of without cross-cost passthrough. With Ramsey-Cournot equivalence, these results extend to the Cournot oligopoly setting with symmetric …rms.
The family of demand systems with consumer surplus a homothetic function of quantities is of course restrictive. But it includes a number of familiar yet diverse special cases, including CES and linear demands and discrete choice models such as logit. Moreover, it shows how those special cases are themselves instances of wider sub-classes of demand systems, involving h(x) 0, linear h(x) and linear q(x) respectively. Finally, the family of demand systems analyzed in this paper provides a natural basis on which to explore the intuition that regulation of multiproduct monopoly should focus on the general level of prices and not the pattern of relative prices. Indeed we showed how that intuition can sometimes be precisely correct, thereby contributing to the theory of multi-dimensional screening.
This expression can then be maximized pointwise with respect to the vector X( ). Since consumer demand at price vector p maximizes u(x) p x, it follows that X( ) is consumer demand corresponding to the price vector p = rh(x ) + + (1 )
Expression (24) and its subsequent discussion then implies that the price vector (52) satis…es (44), and the composite quantity Q corresponding to this price vector maximizes g(Q) Q (p), or in the notation from section 3.1 composite quantity isQ( (p)). Expression (24) also implies that the relative quantities corresponding to prices (52) are just x for each .
At this candidate solution with quantities X( ) =Q( (p)) x , 0 ( ) in (49) is equal to Q ( (p)) 0 and so is weakly decreasing in and the participation constraint is satis…ed for all given it is satis…ed for max . Since in (48) is necessarily convex in , incentive compatibility requires that 0 in (49) be weakly increasing in , which is the case provided that (44) is weakly increasing. Standard arguments (see Lemma 1 in Baron and Myerson) show that it is also su¢cient for incentive compatibility that 0 in (49) weakly increase with . For reference later, it is useful to note that the corresponding incentive payment T ( ) can be calculated from (48) and (49) to be
which depends on x only via its impact on F=f .
